Cloud API penetration testing for AWS, Azure, and GCP
Your cloud is an API surface. Management-plane and IAM APIs, serverless HTTP functions, gateway routes, and storage and data-service APIs each accept requests, and each can grant more than it should. Operator tests that API surface across AWS, Azure, and GCP for broken authorization, broken authentication, and injection, and proves every finding, continuously, before an attacker does.
The cloud API flaws that actually cause breaches
Objects one ID away
Storage and data-service APIs that return another tenant's object when you change an identifier, broken object level authorization no config scan can see.
Over permissive roles
IAM and identity APIs that let a workload's token call operations far beyond its role, turning one foothold into broad reach across the account.
Reachable management plane
Management-plane, gateway, and serverless HTTP APIs left callable without proper authorization, giving an attacker a front door into control operations.
Tested the way an attacker would, without the risk
Cloud moves fast, and an API route that was locked last sprint can be over exposed by this one. Operator tests your cloud API surface continuously and non destructively, honoring provider terms and the scope you set, so a new authorization gap becomes a proven finding rather than a breach.
Findings are chained the way a real intrusion would combine them: a leaked service token plus an over permissive IAM role plus a management-plane API that trusts it becomes a real path in, proven end to end.
- AWS, Azure, and GCP API surface across management-plane, IAM, serverless, gateway, and storage.
- Non destructive and scoped, safe to run against live cloud APIs.
- Chained, proven findings, not isolated config alerts.
- Continuous, matching how fast your cloud APIs change.
Mass assignment turns a member into an owner
A field the API accepts but never validates on a routine update is enough to jump privilege levels, with no admin approving anything.
- Authenticated as a standard project member and called
PATCH /api/v1/projects/proj_50713with only the project name in the body, a change members are meant to make. - Replayed the same request with one extra field appended to the body,
"role": "owner", that the endpoint was never meant to accept from this caller. - The server returned
200 OKwith the caller's own membership record updated to owner, no ownership transfer flow and no second approval. - Confirmed the escalation held by calling
POST /api/v1/projects/proj_50713/keys/rotate, an operation reserved for owners, then repeated the full sequence from a second test account.
PATCH /api/v1/projects/proj_50713 HTTP/1.1
Host: api.example.com
Authorization: Bearer <MEMBER_TOKEN>
Content-Type: application/json
{ "name": "Q3 Rollout", "role": "owner" }
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{ "project_id": "proj_50713", "member_id": "usr_88820", "name": "Q3 Rollout", "role": "owner" }
curl -s -X PATCH https://api.example.com/api/v1/projects/proj_50713 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <MEMBER_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Q3 Rollout","role":"owner"}'
Example finding. Target details redacted.
Illustrative example, not a specific customer result.
Mass assignment survives because an update handler binds the whole request body to a record instead of allowlisting what a given role may change. Project name is writable by any member; role is not, but nothing in the handler enforces that, so a client that sends it gets it saved. Operator finds this class by comparing what each role is authorized to change against what each write operation actually accepts, then trying fields a legitimate client would never send, such as role, owner_id, or is_admin, on every operation in the specification rather than a sample. The same check applies to any resource with an ownership field, which is why it belongs beside the broader privilege escalation class covered in BFLA testing. Nothing reaches you until it is reproduced against the live target, the standard described on the Proof page.
Common questions
What is cloud API penetration testing?
Testing the API surface of your cloud environment: provider management-plane APIs, IAM and identity APIs, serverless and function HTTP APIs, API gateway configurations, and storage and data-service APIs. Operator tests each operation for broken authorization, broken authentication, and injection across roles, and proves every finding with a reproducible exploit chain rather than a list of unverified misconfiguration alerts.
Do AWS, Azure, and GCP allow API penetration testing?
The major providers permit customer testing of your own resources under their acceptable use terms, and non destructive testing of your own API endpoints and services generally does not require prior approval. Operator runs non destructive by default, scopes to the API base URLs you set, and stays inside the boundary you define.
What cloud API issues does it find?
Broken object and function level authorization on management-plane and service APIs, over permissive IAM roles reachable through identity APIs, unauthenticated or misconfigured API gateway routes, serverless HTTP functions exposed without proper authorization, and storage and data-service APIs that leak across accounts, each chained into the path an attacker would actually take and proven with the exact request and response.
Looking for a specific sector instead of cloud infrastructure? See API penetration testing by industry.
Find your cloud API exposure before an attacker does
Point the agent at your cloud API surface and get proven findings across AWS, Azure, and GCP.